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My grandfather, Eric George Laker, was captured at the Battle of 
El Alamein, North Africa, on October 27, 1942. He was held in a 
succession of prisoner of war camps across central Europe before the 
war ended in 1945. For the duration of his captivity he kept a diary, 
which he titled “Summary of Events: From 27th October 1942 to 24th 
May 1945.” At the time of his capture, he was 22 years old. 
Repatriated to England on May 24, 1945–he arrived home in Sussex at 
age 25, having been a prisoner of war for two years and seven months.  
While the bulk of the diary reflects upon his time as a prisoner of 
war, of chief importance and interest to me, however, is the specific 
focus that comes from the initial pages of this diary–The Battle of El 
Alamein. The Second Battle of El Alamein took place over a period of 
20 days from October 23, 1942, until November 11, 1942. The second 
of the two great battles in North Africa, this latter engagement 
resulted in the Axis forces retreating and conceding defeat, despite 
Hitler’s insistence that Rommel “show [the German forces] no other 
road than that to victory or death” (Rommel and Hart 321). It was this 
battle that turned the tide of the second World War in favor of the 
Allies, marking a distinct revival in the morale of the Allied forces and 
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commanders–it was the first major offensive victory against the 
enemy since the start of the European war in 1939. Such was the 
significance of El Alamein that Winston Churchill later “purred 
memorably, ‘Before Alamein we never had a victory. After Alamein we 
never had a defeat’” (qtd. in Dimbley 2)   
Set within this grand and overtly significant historical sequence of 
events, then, was my grandfather–a private in the 4th Battalion Royal 
Sussex Regiment, 133rd Infantry Brigade, X (10th) Corps. At “about 
0900 hrs” on October 28, 1942–seven days after the start of the 
battle–my grandfather was captured by German troops (Laker 3). This 
research focuses simultaneously upon the minute and the massive–on 
my grandfather’s detailed account of his capture and the events of his 
own engagements that lead to it, and it also examines these small and 
personal details within the larger context of the first week of the 
Second Battle of El Alamein. This is not, it must be stressed, a cross-
examination of my grandfather’s account against that of official 
record. What I hope shall emerge from this research and writing is a 
comprehensive portrayal, personal and public, of the events of that 
aforementioned battle, allowing us (myself included) to answer the 
question posed by the late American anthropologist Clifford Geertz, 
“What’s going on here?” (224). 
Given that my grandfather’s diary details the events before his 
capture as well as the capture itself, I hope to draw upon “multiple and 
evolving” realities (Fishman and McCarthy 88) that exist within the 
memory and portrayal of the events surrounding my grandfather. This 
approach leads me to touch upon the research method and the 
analytical framework that I both have used and shall employ in the 
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research and writing of this paper. This paper is an ethnographic one, 
and I freely admit that parts of this work verge into auto-ethnography. 
This, obviously, comes about as a result of my personal investment 
and relationship to the author of my central source, that being my 
grandfather and his diary. Due to this personal relationship to my 
subject, in an aim to provide some academic distance for analysis and 
ease of approach, I shall hereafter refer to my grandfather as Private 
(Pte.) Laker. 
In addition to Pte. Laker’s war diary, the source material I have 
garnered more recently for this project took me to the West Sussex 
Record Office (WSRO), where I was able to view sources from a wide 
selection of public and private material. This material includes, among 
other things, news articles, the records from the chaplain of the 4th 
Battalion, Regimental gazette copies, another soldier’s diary, and the 
battle notes of Laker’s commanding officer (Sir Lashmer Gordon 
Whistler) from the Second Battle of El Alamein. It is worth 
mentioning that without ordering a comprehensive military record of 
Pte. Laker’s service it was incredibly difficult to garner additional 
information specific to him and his own engagements.  
What I have found over the course of my research is a variety of 
different narratives of the events of El Alamein, as well as several 
documents that speak to the larger political context in which the battle 
was set. These include an account of the role of the 4th Battalion as 
part of the 133rd Infantry Brigade during the Battle of El Alamein, 
copies of newsletters from Grace Line Shipping Company, and a brief 
series of newspaper articles published in Sussex in 1979. While much 
more material was available, the specificity of my focus in terms of 
© The Journal of Military Experience 
time frame and involved personnel excluded much of what was 
available to me. Therefore, the context in which this work is being 
produced is one of both primary and secondary sources–with great 
variance in the latter of those two source types. This variety of source 
material, as well as the significance of the events that take place in the 
diary, have allowed me to triangulate my focus. Lastly, I do not claim 
to present the entire history of events in this essay, but rather to 
simply expound upon the initial incidents portrayed in the wartime 
diary of my late grandfather.  
 
Prior Action 
The nature of warfare is one of continual change and upheaval. 
This is reflected not only in the horrific casualties and losses which 
any involved people suffer, but also in the structure of those forces 
involved in the fighting. The resultant military appointments of Pte. 
Laker are both confusing and messy, but it is seen in my sources that 
he was drafted as part of the 4th Battalion of the Royal Sussex 
regiment, given the entry-level rank of private, and allotted the call 
number “6402116” (“RSR/MSS/4/97─War Diary, Nominal Roll”). 
Under the command of Sir Lashmer Gordon Whistler, he was one of 
232 privates from the brigade, out of 289 men in total 
(“RSR/MSS/4/97–War Diary, Nominal Roll”). The majority of these 
men were local to Sussex, “their names often the same as those who 
had left Sussex in earlier years to defeat Napoleon, fight in the Crimea 
and Sudan, and against the Boers, before being decimated on the 
Somme and at Ypres” ("How The Royal Sussex Helped To Defeat 
Rommel"). Prior to arriving in North Africa, the 4th Battalion had 
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served across Northern Europe–chiefly in Belgium and France. The 
copy of Pte. Laker’s diary that resides in the Imperial War Museum in 
London contains the “Ms copy of his unit's Operation Order No 9 
(2pp, 21 May 1940) for the Petegem area of Belgium”–confirming his 
active service in the Northern regions of Europe during the early 
stages of the war (IWM; “Private Papers”).  
I could not find any information on the specific theatre of war in 
Belgium pertinent to him and his regiment, but what I was able to 
discover follows hereafter. As a private in one of the infantry forces 
under the banner of the 44th (Home Counties) Division, and thereby a 
member of the III Corps that formed in France as part of the British 
Expeditionary Force (BEF) in 1940, Pte. Laker would have seen action 
in the Battle of France. This took place across France and the Low 
Countries in the spring of 1940, lasting from the 10th of May until the 
22nd of June. It resulted in a heavy defeat for the Allied forces and the 
fall of France into Axis hands. Much of the BEF retreated towards the 
French coast, evacuating to safety. The most famous evacuation of the 
entire war was that of Dunkirk–which took place between May 26 and 
the June 4, 1940. Pte. Laker and the men of the 4th Royal Sussex were 
on the beaches with thousands of others, waiting in line and wading 
into the water–hoping to make it to the boats bound for home. Under 
duress enough already, Pte. Laker had the additional responsibility of 
serving as the regimental clerk and record keeper. This means, of 
course, that when the battalion took part in the battle and evacuation 
at Dunkirk, he was one of the last men to board the boats to England–
he had to take note of all those who made it on board. Having spent a 
brief leave at home, Pte. Laker returned to active service–eventually 
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arriving in North Africa in May 1942. The 4th Battalion of the Royal 
Sussex was initially involved in the Battle of Alam el Halfa, as one of 
the many smaller component parts of Lieutenant-General Bernard 
Montgomery’s (fondly known to all those under his command as 
“Monty”) Eighth Army. This battle raged from August 30 until 
September 5 1942. Under the command of Major-General Hughes and 
Brigadier Whistler, the 44th Infantry Division (comprised of the 131st 
and 133rd Infantry Brigades) countered what was to be the last major 
Axis offensive of the Western Desert campaign. Despite this successful 
outcome of the battle, Pte. Laker’s brigade is reported to have 
performed poorly–failing to hold their designated outposts for the 
necessary amount of time. The battle plan that German Field Marshall 
Erwin Rommel had devised was to defeat the British 8th Army and 
thereby strengthen the Axis, chiefly German and Italian, claims to the 
North African region. The eventual Allied reinforcements to Monty’s 
army rendered this plan impossible. The resultant retreat by Axis 
forces compromised the military operations at the German base in 
Africa and thereby rendered Axis aims in the Western Desert theatre 
as unattainable. Hereafter, Pte. Laker’s 133rd Infantry Brigade was 
sent to El Alamein to take part in what would become one of the 
defining battles of the war, and indeed the last century. This is where 
his diary begins, and my investigation also. 
 
El Alamein 
Almost unknown at the time of his appointment, Lieutenant-
General Bernard Law Montgomery was determined to “destroy 
Rommel and his army” and “hit him for six, right out of Africa.”. 
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Montgomery’s style was informal and not at all in keeping with the air 
of a commanding officer, and he “inspired the desert army, with his 
strange military hats, his unorthodox uniform, his habit of chatting to 
the men, his visits to cookhouses without warning” ("How the Royal 
Sussex Helped to Defeat Rommel").  
By the time Pte. Laker arrived at El Alamein, Lieutenant-General 
Montgomery had been forced to re-evaluate his plans for the Western 
Desert theatre. As the fighting had continued across North Africa 
through September and into October, Montgomery noted in his diary 
that it was “becoming essential to break through somewhere” (Barr 
369). Indeed, he began to have severe doubts about his methods and 
plans and “feared that me might be asking too much of his ‘somewhat 
untrained troops’” (Playfair et al 6). Hatching a new plan in the early 
part of October, General Montgomery decided to “alter the design of 
the battle on the front of the main attack, after the infantry had 
broken into the enemy’s defended zone” (Playfair et al 6). As part of 
this new plan, and all infantry would be covered by “very strong 
artillery support” and would “widen the breach to [the] north and 
south” thereby “methodically destroy[ing] the enemy’s holding 
troops” – a process Montgomery named “crumbling” (Playfair et al 6). 
This new approach of General Montgomery is reflected in the first 
paragraph of Pte. Laker’s diary: 
  
I may as well give the objective of the attack. The Rifle Brigade 
was supposed to have taken the position which was classed as 
a strong point. Apparently they had not done so, and the 
88mm guns there were providing an obstacle to our tanks. We 
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were to go in with the design of putting out the 88s, hold the 
position until dawn, when our tanks would go through us and 
we would withdraw, our job done. That was what it was on 
paper. (Laker 2)11 
 
The armored divisions were to be properly enforced with new 
equipment so that they could make this supportive action count. This 
re-equipping affected Pte. Laker’s 133rd Infantry Brigade, now under 
the control of the 10th Armored Division. Many of the armored 
divisions received their equipment with weeks to spare, time enough 
to train with it and familiarize the men with the new plan. The 10th 
Armored Division, and by default Pte. Laker, had no such luck. They 
were “hampered by the late arrival of equipment, which delayed the 
reorganization of the 133rd Infantry Brigade as a lorried infantry 
brigade” (Playfair et al 14). Additionally, there was “no settled or 
agreed War Establishment or scale of equipment for a lorried infantry 
brigade, [and] no extra staff or signals had been provided” (Latimer 
257). Having been an “ordinary infantry brigade until 8 September,” 
the men of the 133rd Lorried Infantry had their work cut out for them 
with barely days to retrain, rearm, and reorganize within the confines 
of General Montgomery’s new plan (Latimer 257).  
Montgomery’s plan then, while far larger in scale, trickled down to 
the smallest of military levels–the Allied infantry push would be 
swiftly followed by artillery and tanks, which would in turn force the 
Axis infantry defenses back and engage their respective armor, unable 
                                                 
11 Throughout Private Laker’s diary, all exclamation marks and 
question marks are prefaced by a period. This is due to a technical 
function on the typewriter that he used to copy his diary after the war. 
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to “stand idle while the defences [sic] crumbled away” (Playfair et al 
6). To make this new plan work, the aforementioned issue of the 
“somewhat untrained troops” now had to be amended (Playfair et al 
6). Montgomery, only adding to his burgeoning reputation as a 
competent commander of men in the field, had realized that “his 
Army was badly in need of training, and … insisted on training for the 
particular type of battle he had devised” (Playfair et al 6). Pte. Laker’s 
brigade, the 133rd Infantry, fell under that umbrella of re-training. As 
noted in the writings that are attributed to the chaplain of the 4th 
Royal Sussex Battalion, “We had trained strenuously with the 133rd 
Lorried Brigade for close on six weeks during which time we had 
learned to find our way, but night and day, across desert trenches 
using only the compass” (RSR/MSS/4/101–“With the 4th”). The 
brevity and intensity of this training was not uncommon. Most other 
divisions underwent “short periods of training, … mostly by a brigade 
at a time. Exercises were so arranged that units (unwittingly–for 
reasons of security) rehearsed their parts in the coming battle” 
(Playfair et al 14).  
The portion of the plan that involved Pte. Laker was not met with 
overwhelming enthusiasm. Among those doubting the newly trained 
troops’ ability to execute the new plan properly was the commander of 
the 10th Corps, General Herbert Lumsden. Described later in his 
TIME Magazine obituary from January 22, 1945, as a “glint-eyed” 
man, Lumsden warned his men that under no circumstances should 
they “rush blindly on to the enemy’s anti-tank guns or try to pass 
through a narrow bottleneck which is covered by a concentration of 
enemy tanks” (“A General Dies At Sea”; Playfair et al 35). He went on 
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to write that in the assured state of chaos that would unfold the 
battlefield, his men must employ “a proper co-ordinated [sic] plan” 
(Playfair et al 35). General Montgomery, despite doubts from his 
generals, gave word that his orders should be followed “exactly as he 
had directed,” envisioning the need to “Organise ahead for a ‘dogfight’ 
of a week. Whole affair about 12 days” (Playfair et al 35). 
The battle of El Alamein began on Friday, October 23. The 
chaplain of the 4th Battalion Royal Sussex recorded that “the earth 
and sky suddenly rocked. This was the moment for which we had 
waited. The gigantic detonations and explosions increased and soon 
we were on the move forward to the battle” (RSR/MSS/4/101–“With 
the 4th”). The men of the 4th Battalion Royal Sussex continued to 
move forward “with intermittent speeds, sometimes halting or 
crawling along at slow speed, at other times making a sudden dash 
forward” (RSR/MSS/4/101–“With the 4th”). These movements would 
have been made all the more difficult due to the fact that the 
transportation vehicles of the 133rd Lorried Infantry Brigade were 
“entirely unarmoured [sic]–unlike the motor battalions’ large scale 
carriers” and their subsequent “requests for armoured [sic] 
vehicles…had been refused” (Latimer 257). Attacks took place all day 
and night, pitting the American Sherman and British Crusader tanks 
versus the German Panzers, all manner of heavy artillery, and infantry 
insurgencies and counter-movements. The men of the 133rd Lorried 
Brigade, Pte. Laker among them, were forced to form a “pivot of 
manouvere” along the southern Miteirya Ridge, under the cover of 
“Night-flying Hurricanes [that] would again patrol the area” (Playfair 
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et al 45).12 These night bombing raids lit up the darkness of the 
surrounding desert night; “our bombing shuttle service was a picture 
to behold,” wrote Rifleman Suckling of the Rifle Battalion (qtd. in 
Lucas 222). Such a sight, the “bright glow” that Pte. Laker makes 
mention of, is demonstrated in the two photographs in Appendix A 
(Laker 2). These photographs detail both the opening bombardment 
of October 23rd and the bombing of the Miteirya Ridge, the same 
ridge that the men of the 133rd Lorried Brigade had pivoted around 
on that first morning of the battle.  
Such was the importance of this maneuver by the 133rd that 
General Lumsden wrote in his diary that while “we may get through to 
where his [the enemy] guns are now. It is a tremendous decision. If we 
don’t do it the battle just fizzes out” (qtd. in Barr 330).Sadly for the 
men of the 133rd Lorried Infantry, and indeed for Pte. Laker, Playfair 
points out that the “night’s operations were ill-fated from the start” 
(45). With far, far “more mines on and beyond the Miteirya Ridge 
than had been expected,” the clearing of these “amid many 
distractions” proved incredibly difficult (Playfair et al 45). 
Furthermore, amid the chaos, “many vehicles were set on fire, and the 
blaze attracted more bombing and more shelling.” In an effort to 
minimize casualties, “the regiments dispersed as best they could, but 
much delay and some disorganization resulted” (Playfair et al 45). Pte. 
                                                 
12The use of aerial bombardment was commonplace in the war by this 
time, and El Alamein was no different from any other theatre of battle. 
Bombing of Axis targets commenced on the first day of battle, 
predominantly taking place under cover of darkness. 
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Laker’s diary reflects this disorganization: “Almost from the start the 
manoeuvre [sic] was a fiasco–unfortunately for us!” (Laker 1). 
A further example of the disorganization that came with the 
restructuring of the regiment was demonstrated in the 
communications systems utilized on the battlefield. Such was the 
chaotic nature of the Battle of El Alamein that many of the 
communications networks were temporarily disabled or entirely 
knocked out during the initial phases of the battle. Such is the 
complexity of these communications networks that the widespread 
fighting readily knocks out any method of communications that 
officers in the field may use to pass on orders to their troops. An 
example of these networks, one of dozens present at Alamein, is given 
in the diagram of New Zealand military divisional signals as shown in 
Appendix B. These networks crisscrossed each other, adding layers of 
potential disaster to the already incredibly dangerous environment 
that Pte. Laker and his fellows were fighting in. As the battle 
continued, the men of the 4th Royal Sussex, and thereby the 133rd 
Lorried Infantry Brigade, suffered frequent outages of 
communications, making all orders nearly impossible to update. This 
chaos appears across many sources. First of all, in Pte. Laker’s diary, 
he recalls that there were men and Commanding Officers “dashing 
here, there, and all over the place, trying to put their men ‘in the 
picture’ but owing to the rush instructions were perforce of a very 
much abridged nature” (Laker 1). “Everybody looks shaken for no 
communication has come from Bn. H.Q.,” wrote the chaplain of the 
4th Royal Sussex (RSR/MSS/4/101–“With the 4th”). He and his men 
seem to have lost contact with their commanding officers at some 
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point during their offensives, “Where are the company commanders? 
Where is the C.O.? …No one seems to know!” (RSR/MSS/4/101–
“With the 4th”). On October 28, the official diary of the 133rd Lorried 
Infantry Brigade notes that “Communications between the reserve coy 
and Bn H.Q. had not yet been established and it was impossible owing 
to the enemy fire even to look over the intervening ridge, it was not 
possible to prove whether the forward positions had been over-run 
until darkness fell” (RSR/MSS/4/97─“War Diary” 3).  
The Battle of El Alamein rolled on, and Pte. Laker’s 133rd Lorried 
Infantry moved deeper into enemy territory, having been routed and 
rebuffed on several occasions. Pte. Laker was put into action on 
October 25th. The men of the 4th Royal Sussex Regiment, including 
those of the 133rd Lorried Infantry Brigade, were put into a night 
attack and were instructed to capture one of three enemy 
strongpoints, known as Woodcock (on the right), Kidney Ridge (down 
the center), and Snipe (on the left). The target for Pte. Laker and his 
cohorts was that aforementioned “position dubbed Woodcock” (“How 
the Royal Sussex Helped to Defeat Rommel”). The night attack on 
October 25th had been “preceded by an immense artillery barrage” as 
per Montgomery’s new plan (“How the Royal Sussex Helped to Defeat 
Rommel”). The three points of Woodcock, Snipe, and Kidney Ridge 
proved hard to capture, as the “enemy infantry, dug into narrow slit 
trenches surrounded by scattered mines and barbed wire, put up a 
fierce resistance” (“How the Royal Sussex Helped to Defeat Rommel”). 
The men of the “2 and 4 R. Sussex were pinned to the ground by the 
fire ensuing from the armed battles” (RSR 1/138-153–“War Diary” 1). 
Happily for Pte. Laker, it was seen that “at first light [that] all three 
© The Journal of Military Experience 
objectives had been gained,” which, in light of the fact that large 
numbers of “Sussex men had died, or were wounded during the 
attack,” was a remarkable achievement (RSR 1/138-153–“War Diary” 
1). According to the official war diary of the 133rd Lorried Infantry 
Brigade, it was reported that at “529hrs 4 R. Sussex were in 
possession of WOODCOCK” (RSR 1/138-153–“War Diary” 3). On the 
morning of October 27, the 133rd had been ordered to “relieve the 2nd 
Rifle Brigade in place on Snipe” (Latimer 257). Sadly, a confusion in 
the accuracy of the maps that had been approved for military use and 
planning–a contour in the land being mistaken for what was in fact a 
“deepish depression”–led the aforementioned 2nd Rifle Brigade “too 
far left of Snipe,” a move that would “lead to tragedy for the 4th Royal 
Sussex Regiment”–and Pte. Laker (Latimer 257). 
 
Captivity 
The main focal point of Pte. Laker’s diary is his experiences in the 
succession of Prisoner of War (POW) camps where he was held for the 
remainder of the war following his capture at El Alamein. The exact 
events surrounding his capture are murky, depending upon the source 
being used to determine the truth of the situation. However, my 
research allows me to dovetail multiple accounts of the same events 
and draw some conclusions.  
According to Brigadier Alec W. Lee, the commanding officer of the 
133rd Lorried Infantry Regiment, on the morning of October 28, at 
“approx 0730 hrs the Bde’s right fwd position WOODCOCK held by 
the 4 R. Sussex was over-run by the enemy” (RSR 1/138-153–“War 
Diary” 3). As Barr notes, “the men of the 4th Royal Sussex were not 
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desert veterans… [and] their inexperience proved costly” (Barr 356). 
He quotes Lieutenant C. E. Hutchinson, the acting observation officer 
with the 2nd Kings Royal Rifle Corps, the same corps that the men of 
the 4th Royal Sussex (specifically the 133rd Lorried Infantry Brigade) 
had been sent to help: “40 or 50 inf whom, I was told, were a coy of 
the 4 Bn Royal Sussex Regt; they were being rounded up by two 
Mk.IIIs and two M.13s” (Barr 359).13 The report of Lieutenant 
Hutchinson matches “How the Royal Sussex Helped to Defeat 
Rommel” in that it details the suddenness with which the men were 
“over-run by German tanks” (“How the Sussex Helped to Defeat 
Rommel”). As a result of this surprise cornering, “some 400 men of 
the battalion” were “marched away across the sand into captivity” 
(“How the Sussex Helped to Defeat Rommel”). The complications in 
varying accounts begin here. The war diary of the 133rd notes that two 
groups of men from the 4th Royal Sussex were taken prisoner that 
day, but one around 0730 and one later–approximated at 0800 hours 
or so. Pte. Laker’s diary reflects that he was among the latter group of 
men taken prisoner: 
 
At about 0900 hrs we received the shock of our lives. We were 
contently playing with our automatics when I looked up and 
saw some of our fellows climbing out of their slit trenches with 
their hands up.! One even had a white handkerchief tied to his 
rifle. I blinked and then looked around. I saw a tank that had 
                                                 
13The Mk.III tank that Lieutenant Hutchinson refers to, I believe, was 
the Nazi Panzer III–one of the most commonly used Axis tanks of the 
war. Additionally, the M.13 tank was an Italian Fiat-AnsaldoM13/40, 
the main tank that the Italians used for the duration of the war. 
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come over the ridge with others to the right of it. A fellow was 
sitting on the top with a nasty looking L.M.G. which he was 
waving around in a most unfriendly manner, and walking 
beside the tank was another chap with a revolver. He was 
waving his hands around him indicating to our fellows that 
they were to come with him and surrender. Then to my horror 
I saw a black cross on the front of the tank. (Laker 3) 
 
The description that Pte. Laker gives of the events surrounding his 
capture, indeed the time that he notes it took place, match the time 
frame of the aforementioned Lieutenant Hutchinson. Given the 
instability of military communications during the battle, it is no 
surprise there is an hour difference between the accounts of 
Lieutenant Hutchinson and Pte. Laker. 
Brigadier Lee notes in the diary of the 133rd that “wireless 
communications…broke down,”14 and that every battalion was “under 
continuous fire from small arms, mortars and arty… confined to their 
slit trenches, intercommunication being impossible” ((RSR 1/138-
153–“War Diary” 3, 4). It was only later in the morning when he could 
confirm, “the whole of Bn H.Q. were among those presumed taken 
prisoner” (RSR 1/138-153–“War Diary” 3). This group of men, I 
believe, included Pte. Laker. The losses of the 4th Royal Sussex from 
the day were totaled at “47 killed and 342 missing,” and Brigadier Lee 
later complained to his superiors that his brigade had been 
                                                 
14War Diary. Copy of the Official War Diary of the 133rd Infantry 
Brigade, The Royal Sussex Regiment. Compiled by Brigadier Alec W. 
Lee. 3. 
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“completely unsupported by armour” and as a result had easily 
succumbed to enemy pressures (Playfair et al 47; Latimer 258).  
Pte. Laker’s diary, detailing the gut-wrenching confusion that he 
felt at the moment of his capture, mirrors the frustrations of Brigadier 
Lee. Disbelief was rife among the men, with Pte. Laker being 
“convinced that no man living can put into words what my feelings 
were at that moment” (Laker 3). Interestingly, and perhaps 
commonplace in such situations, Laker’s diary and his own feelings at 
his capture remain defiant for a short while: “What had happened? 
Had our tanks been beaten back? Impossible.! Had Jerry made a 
counter attack and broken through our companies.? Question after 
question flashed through my mind as we sat seemingly frozen. 
Prisoners of war–horrible thought.!” (Laker 3).At the beginning of his 
diary, Pte. Laker writes that his being a prisoner of war was (at the 
time), 
 
Funny…really, because whoever I speak to agrees with me that 
that is the last thing that enters ones head when going into 
action. The thought that you might stop a fatal one occurs to 
you, and also that you may get wounded either more or less 
severely, but that you may be captured never enters your head. 
Maybe it is just as well. (Laker 1) 
 
Given that he would be held as a prisoner for the next 2 years and 7 
months of his life, there is a grim irony at his outrage and somewhat 
humorous assessment of the previously unconsidered outcome of 
being on active duty for a nation at war. 
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The resultant Allied victory at the Battle of El Alamein was 
heralded throughout the world as the moment that turned the tide in 
the favor of the Allied forces. The reporting of the involvement of the 
Royal Sussex Regiment was far more locally based. An extract from 
the Egyptian Gazette of November 8, 1942, tells of the actions of 
those brave men. The 4th Royal Sussex Regiment, according to the 
unnamed Brigadier who was interviewed for the piece, “had captured 
two vital features, driving a deep wedge into the enemy line. It was 
certain that the Germans would try their hardest to win back this 
ground” (RSR/MSS/2/149–“Well Done the Sussex”).15 The following 
morning, the Brigadier touches upon the series of incidents 
concerning the capture of 342 men, including Pte. Laker: “At first light 
they attacked with tanks and over-ran some of the forward troops. 
They shelled the Sussex lines and raked it with machine-gun fire. 
Every weapon they could bring to bear opened up at the slightest hint 
of a movement. But the Sussex held on grimly” (RSR/MSS/2/149–
“Well Done the Sussex”). It was this group of forward troops, overrun 
by the German offensive line, which included Pte. Laker. The article 
goes on to quote another Pte. from the regiment, Pte. Harvey. 
Harvey’s mood, having survived the battle and avoided capture, is 
optimistic and expectant: “It was our first real battle out here and all 
the boys are really fighting fit now” (RSR/MSS/2/149–“Well Done the 
Sussex”). It reads as though Harvey considers El Alamein a training 
                                                 
15 It is safe for us to assume that these two vital positions were 
Woodcock and Snipe, the points of attack and movement for the 4th 
Royal Sussex and the 133rd Lorried Infantry Brigade. 
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exercise of sorts, as a warm up for some hitherto unknown larger 
event.  
 
Conclusion 
It is an odd thing to find the events that shaped the life of someone 
you love have been distilled to words devoid of detail and emotional 
recognition. Some of the accounts of these events border upon jocular. 
This is why the diary of Pte. Laker carries such particular resonance 
for me. Obvious familial bond aside, I find the detail that he writes 
with and the accuracy of detail he blatantly strives to achieve both 
refreshing and, more than occasionally, alarming. The large majority 
of his diary details his day-to-day life in a succession of camps, but my 
curiosity about the events surrounding his capture afforded me the 
opportunity to delve further into his past. He was a quiet and reserved 
man, and barely spoke of his experiences during the war. The details I 
have included in this piece add flesh to the skeletal description and 
notes that my grandfather makes in his diary. It is my hope, somehow, 
that these additions add greater depth to the experiences of Pte. 
Laker, and also that anyone reading this can gain a tangible sense of 
the man I knew simply as Grandad.  
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